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DIGITIZING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF
BIG DATA POLICING
Charles E. Volkwein*
ABSTRACT
Today’s availability of massive data sets, inexpensive data storage, and
sophisticated analytical software has transformed the capabilities of law enforcement and
created new forms of “Big Data Policing.” While Big Data Policing may improve the
administration of public safety, these methods endanger constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures. This Article explores the Fourth Amendment
consequences of Big Data Policing in three parts. First, it provides an overview of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and its evolution in light of new policing technologies. Next, the
Article reviews the concept of “Big Data” and examines three forms of Big Data Policing:
Predictive Policing Technology (PPT); data collected by third-parties and purchased by
law enforcement; and geofence warrants. Finally, the Article concludes with proposed
solutions to rebalance the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment against these
new forms of policing.

INTRODUCTION
We live in an era where digital information is ubiquitous. The ability to
collect, store, process, and analyze large quantities of information yields a wealth
of insight to the end user about individual and group behavior, thought and desire.
This process, called “Big Data,” is leveraged by law enforcement to enhance
enforcement capabilities and maintain public safety. 1 Big Data policing on the one
hand may be beneficial to the administration of public safety; however, it raises
serious concerns about how these new methods impact existing Fourth Amendment
protections against unwarranted searches and seizures. This paper examines how
Big Data policing impacts the Fourth Amendment and endangers existing
constitutional privacy protections. I argue that current interpretive doctrines of what
constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment must be adapted and
implemented with additional legislative safeguards to ensure that Big Data policing
methods do not erode constitutionally guaranteed protections against warrantless
government searches.
To make this argument, I begin with an overview of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. I describe the evolution of how the concept of a search is understood
considering advancements in policing technology. Next, I turn to Big Data policing
specifically. I provide a brief, technical definition of Big Data and then identify
three examples of Big Data policing in practice. Each example will discuss how the
technology or method interacts with the Fourth Amendment, illustrating how these
*
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See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89
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tools are challenge constitutional protections against warrantless and arbitrary
searches and seizures. In conclusion, I advocate for measures that rebalance
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures posed by Big Data policing. I propose potential legislative solutions
designed to fill in the gaps where the Fourth Amendment may still fall short in
mitigating the erosion of rights to individual rights and informational privacy
caused by Big Data policing.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”
and provides that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” 2 A
warrant issued upon probable cause must be “supported by [o]ath or affirmation,
and particularly describe[] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”3 Warrant applications must be submitted to a “neutral and detached” judge
or magistrate.4 That judge, in turn, makes an “informed and deliberate” decision
regarding the warrant’s showing of probable cause and particularity. 5 In some
cases, law enforcement are permitted to conduct a search without a warrant. One
exception to the warrant requirement is a law enforcement official’s power to stopand-frisk an individual based on “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” 6 This
power is uniquely augmented by Big Data policing capabilities and will be
discussed in the context of predictive policing later in this paper.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is patchwork and fact- specific, with
multiple competing doctrines informing the courts’ decision-making as to what new
policing methods and technology constitute searches or seizures. 7 The evolving
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment reflect the push-and-pull relationship
between the public’s right to privacy and security in their persons, places, and
things and the government’s desire to ensure public safety. Courts initially
interpreted the Fourth Amendment narrowly, limiting its scope as a right grounded
in property protecting only against physical intrusion of private spaces.8 In response
2

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Id.
4
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
5
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
6
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)
(“[P]olice can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if
the officer lacks probable cause.”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
7
Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
476, 480 (2011), https://harvardlawreview.org/2011/12/an-equilibrium-adjustment-theory-of-thefourth-amendment/.
8
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This property-based approach is known
as the trespass doctrine. See also Laura Hecht-Felella, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age:
How Carpenter Can Shape Privacy Protections for New Technologies, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/fourth-amendmentdigital-age.
3
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to new policing technologies used in the absence of warrants, the interpretation
expanded to “protect people and not simply areas,” with the Supreme Court holding
that the Fourth Amendment’s applicability “cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion.”9 Trespass was no longer the controlling factor to
assess whether a search occurred; rather, a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy became part of the equation, so long as that reasonable expectation was still
grounded in material things. Through its decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) the Supreme Court established a two-part doctrine to determine whether
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy which, subject to some
exceptions, cannot be violated without a warrant. The doctrine holds that if a person
harbors a subjective expectation of privacy in a given place or toward a given thing,
and society objectively accepts the reasonableness of that expectation then the
individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy that cannot be invaded
without a warrant.10
The reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine is tempered, however, by
yet another principle informing the analysis of a potential Fourth Amendment
violation: the third-party doctrine. If an individual voluntarily shares information
with a third-party, that individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy to the
information shared with the third-party is nullified; therefore, a warrant is not
required for law enforcement to access the information.11 The Supreme Court
codified the third-party in two cases, United States v. Miller (1976) and Smith v.
Maryland (1979). In Miller, the Supreme Court held that defendant Mitch Miller
possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy to the contents of his checks and
deposit slips which he had voluntarily shared with his bank. The Court reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because this information, was not a
confidential communication, but instead, a voluntarily conveyed instrument used
in routine commercial transactions by the bank and its employees. 12
Three years later, in Smith the Court affirmed the third-party doctrine. In
that case, the Supreme Court found no violation of the Fourth Amendment when
police warrantlessly installed a pen register, which is an electronic device that
records numbers dialed from a telephone, on defendant Michael Smith’s telephone.
The Court found that Mr. Smith possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy to
the telephone numbers he dialed, because he voluntarily shared those numbers with
the telephone company, who records them as part of its ordinary business
practices.13 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Mr. Smith assumed the risk that
the company might reveal the information he voluntarily conveyed to it, therefore

9

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353 (holding that an eavesdropping device placed on a public pay phone
by law enforcement to listen to calls without a warrant constituted an unreasonable search).
10
Id. at 361 (“[If the Fourth Amendment protects people not places], the question is what
protection it affords those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires
reference to a ‘place.’”) (Harlan, J., concurring).
11
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979).
12
Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.
13
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
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the installation and use of a pen register collecting this same information is not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.14
The Supreme Court addressed both the reasonable expectations of privacy
and third-party doctrines in Carpenter v. United States (2018). The Court’s holding
in Carpenter represents another stage in the evolution of Fourth Amendment
interpretation, advancing the concept of reasonable expectations to privacy further
to adapt the amendment to the digital age. In Carpenter, the Court held that a mobile
phone user possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical cell-site
location information (CSLI), which are records generated and retained by the user’s
cellular service provider (a third-party).15 To access this information, law
enforcement must get a traditional warrant. 16
Prior to Carpenter, the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine was
limited to places and things. Carpenter shifts the inquiry from an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy concerning a place or thing to their reasonable
expectation of what law enforcement can access and discover in the digital age. 17
This shift represents the Court’s acknowledgment that “‘[t]here is a world of
difference’ . . . ‘between the limited types of personal information’ at issue before
the digital age and the ‘exhaustive chronicle’ of information . . . new technologies
can provide.”18 To put it another way, Carpenter recenters the reasonable
expectations inquiry on whether “a prior limit on government power has been
lifted” that permits the Government to take investigative steps that “far exceed their
powers in the past” and, therefore, “contravene[] expectations.” 19 If technology
enables surveillance that could not occur before, the new surveillance becomes a
search.20 The Court’s ruling also declined to extend the third-party doctrine to
CSLI, noting that “data generated by technologies that are integral to modern day
life are [not voluntarily shared] when the production of this information is
‘inescapable and automatic.’”21 However, the Court did not categorically do away
with the third-party doctrine as an avenue for interpretation, explicitly noting that
its holding in Carpenter does not impact the precedent it set in Smith or Miller.22
The post-Carpenter Court has multiple avenues from which to approach the
inquiry of whether a police activity is a search. In Part III of this analysis, I identify
several methods of modern policing that the Court’s new reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine will need to address. In Part IV, I argue that the Supreme Court
will need to extend and clarify its new reasonable expectations of privacy test
further to properly rebalance privacy rights considering the Big Data policing
tactics explored in Part III.
14

Id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
16
Id.
17
Orin S. Kerr, “Implementing Carpenter,” in The Digital Fourth Amendment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 6,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257.
18
Id. at 16 (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219).
19
Id. at 10.
20
Id.
21
Hecht-Felella, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223).
22
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
15
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II.

WHAT IS BIG DATA AND HOW DO LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES USE IT

“Big Data” is a buzzword attributed to all sorts of digital activities in the
public and private sectors. Although it seems that everyone in every industry,
sector, and enterprise uses “Big Data,” it can be difficult to attribute a single
definition to the term. Is it a noun? Is it a verb? How “Big” is “Big”? Furthermore,
what is “Data”? The next section will provide a brief overview and definition of the
term before exploring its use by law enforcement.
a. Big Data: A Brief Technical Overview
Though it is a “generalized [and] imprecise term,” Big Data is not
impossible to concretely define. 23 To begin, the term itself refers to the collection
of large quantities of data. There is no set amount of data that, once collected,
defines a dataset as “Big.” Rather, the adjective refers to the principle that “larger
data sets generate results with greater truth, objectivity and accuracy.” 24 Volume,
variety, and velocity are the “common framework” through which data collection
and analysis are viewed and classified as Big Data. 25 “Data,” in this context, I define
as digitally available information (regardless of source or input) about persons,
whether they are acting as individuals or in groups. Because “nearly every piece of
information . . . is capable of digitization and storage,” the pervasiveness of Big
Data will only increase. 26 At its core, Big Data’s power “lies in capturing the
massive reserves of data that are incidentally, as well as purposefully, generated
through increasingly detailed electronic documentation of individuals’ everyday
lives.27
Large and diverse data sets containing intimate information are only half of
the equation. The term “Big Data” also encapsulates how data is studied and
analyzed to generate conclusions, namely correlative predictions, and insights into
patterns of behavior concerning the individuals and groups whose data is collected.
Big Data describes how tools that “maximize computational power and algorithmic

23

Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014),
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol55/iss1/4.
24
Id.
25
Amir Gandomi & Murtaza Haider, Beyond the Hype: Big Data Concepts, Methods, and
Analytics, 35 Int’l. J. Of Info. Mgmt. 137, 138 (2015),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268401214001066; see also, Timothy A.
Asta, Guardians of the Galaxy of Personal Data: Assessing the Threat of Big Data and
Examining Potential Corporate and Governmental Solutions, 45 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 261, 267
(2019), https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol45/iss1/6 (“[t]he 3 Vs . . . can be used to identify datasets that
are so large in volume, so diverse in variety or moving with such velocity, that traditional modes
of data capture and analysis are insufficient.”).
26
Joh, supra note 1, at 38.
27
Carey Devens et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 Cornell L. Rev. 357, 363 (2017),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol27/iss2/3/.
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accuracy” magnify and manipulate vast troves of information. 28 Likewise, when
drawing conclusions, Big Data is “empirical, algorithmic, and deterministic.” 29 In
sum, Big Data refers to the operation by which large amounts of digital information
are amassed and subjected to analysis by algorithms or other analytical methods,
which revealing correlations of value to the end user of the data. These algorithms
are crafted to provide any number of desired insights or outcomes to the end user. 30
Despite the perceived objectivity of Big Data and its widespread adoption
by police departments of all sizes, it is crucial to highlight its limitations. Decisions
made by police about what data is collected and how it is collected reflect human
biases, impacting the efficacy, accuracy and quality of the data collected. 31
Furthermore, Big Data’s capacity to accurately and completely create an image of
who a person is or whether they are more prone to commit a certain act is limited.
Once the information is collected, analytical models and algorithms cannot
“innovate beyond the paradigm of [their] creators” and are only as good as the data
provided to them.32 Accurate insights cannot be extrapolated from poor data.
Finally, decisions about how to interpret conclusions rendered from Big Data raise
further vulnerabilities, particularly in the criminal justice context, where stakes are
high. Data may indicate one reality, but the complexities of human nature often
cannot be boiled down to a few data points. In sum as the next section details, while
the benefits are clear to law enforcement, poor data and faulty analysis in Big Data
policing risks increasing the likelihood of arbitrary surveillance, warrantless
searches and seizures, and even illegitimate detentions of innocent individuals. 33
b. Big Data Policing: What It Looks Like
Law enforcement agencies have historically relied on data collection and
analysis to inform their administration of public safety. 34 However, now, because
of the eruption and demands of the modern information economy, law enforcement
agencies have access to massive amounts of consumer data, historical and realtime, that allow them to “essentially pluck a suspect out of thin air.” 35 Big Data
28

Crawford & Schultz, supra note 23, at 96.
Devens et al., supra note 27, at 360.
30
Id.
31
See Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 192, 208 (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3333423.
32
Crawford & Schultz, supra note 23, at 96.
33
See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020),
nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html.
34
See Jennifer Bachner, Predictive Policing: Preventing Crime with Data and Analytics, IBM
Center for the Business of Government (2013),
https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Management%20Predictive%20Policing
.pdf.
35
Jennifer Lynch, Modern-Day General Warrants and the Challenge of Protecting Third Party
Privacy Rights in Mass Suspicion-less Searches of Consumer Databases, Hoover Working Group.
on National Security, Technology and Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 2104, 1,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/modern-day-general-warrants-and- challenge-protecting-thirdparty-privacy-rights-mass-suspicionless.
29
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amplifies the potency and scope of traditional police activities dramatically. Indeed,
“the surveillance capacities of police today far exceed what armies of police
officers could accomplish without access to [B]ig [D]ata” in the past. 36 Law
enforcement “now ha[s] relatively easy and inexpensive access to data that can
identify and track all of us.”37 At what point do surveillance, data collection and
predictive technologies, employed without warrants, become searches and seizures
that violate the Fourth Amendment? Should a computer program decide whether
“reasonable suspicion exists” as a pretext to stop and frisk someone on the street?
To illustrate how law enforcement agencies’ leveraging of Big Data
imperils Fourth Amendment protections, I provide an overview of three examples
of Big Data techniques used by police: (1) predictive policing; (2) the purchasing
of third-party harvested consumer data; and (3) geofencing.
i. Predictive Policing Technology (“PPT”)
“Predictive policing refers to any policing strategy or tactic that develops
and uses information and advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime
prevention.”38 The idea of predictive policing is not new, but how it is currently
employed is markedly more potent than its early roots.39 Traditionally, predictive
policing relied on crime-mapping with historical crime data collected and analyzed
to produce a physical map of where such crime is occurring, which would then be
used to deploy resources.40 Modern predictive policing attempts to be proactive,
building on this information to, in theory, prevent crime before it happens. PPT
“predicts” crimes or suspicious targets using artificial intelligence and algorithms
to visualize correlations and patterns within large quantities of data about a given
geographical area.41 Police departments’ access to cheap and voluminous data
storage combined with powerful analytical processing capabilities make PPT a
potent crime prevention technique. 42
There are two primary forms of PPT: place-based and person-based.43
Place-based PPT, which has been more widely adopted than person-based, still
relies on historical crime data to produce detailed spatial and temporal maps that

36

Joh, supra note 1, at 60.
Lynch, supra note 35, at 1.
38
Andrew G. Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 Emory L. J. 259, 265
(2012), https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol62/iss2/1 (quoting, Craig D. Uchida, A
National Discussion on Predictive Policing: Defining Our Terms and Mapping Successful
Implementation Strategies, Nat’l Inst. Of Just., No. NCJ 230404 (2009)).
39
See Bachner, supra note 34, at 86 (describing early forms of crime mapping in the 19th century).
40
Id.
41
Ferguson, supra note 38, at 266 (“A simple predictive policing model might take historical data
about a particular type of crime, the location and the time of that crime and plot those past crimes .
. . . A more complex predictive policing model might involve event-based concerns—such as
arrests, calls for services or incident reports.”).
42
Bachner, supra note 34, at 86.
43
See Tim Lau, Predictive Policing Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained.
37
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identify places and times that have a high risk of crime. 44 So- called “hotspot”
detection enables law enforcement to forecast where crime is more likely to occur
and, with targeted resource deployment, proactively reduce the likelihood of that
occurrence.45 The New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), for example, uses
a Domain Awareness System (“DAS”) that stores and processes information
obtained from a network of information collection inputs around the city (e.g.,
cameras, databases, radiation sensors, and automatic license plate readers). 46 With
predictive algorithms for several different categories of crime, the NYPD deploys
officers based on the insights DAS provides.47
Person-based PPT is used to detect persons of interest or individuals likely
to be involved in a crime. One method of person-based PPT is employed through
social network analysis (“SNA”), where “a target’s numerous interpersonal
relationships are mapped and mine[ed] for actionable information.” 48 Another
method employed uses the collection and review of crime databases in combination
with third-party data to identify individuals who are at risk of being a party to a
criminal act.49
The widespread adoption of PPT by law enforcement agencies raises two
primary concerns. First, PPT allows law enforcement to outsource the prerequisite
of establishing reasonable suspicion prior to a search, to an algorithm. Because
PPT’s data-backed insights appear objective and unbiased, police may over rely on
those insights to establish reasonable suspicion and initiate a search. 50 Experience
shows that PPT programs suffer from lack of accuracy and objectivity in their
data.51 Historical crime data informing PPT systems often comes from
“documented periods of flawed, racially biased, and sometimes unlawful practices
and policies.”52 Simply put, “dirty” data cannot produce accurate results because
the data itself is fundamentally flawed. 53 Compounding this flaw is the fact that
individuals with prior interactions with law enforcement, even if those interactions
were the product of illegitimate policing practices, will have that information
Id. See also Bachner, supra note 34, at 87 (“It is important to keep in mind that a hot spot is a
perceptual construct. Because geographical space is inherently continuous, the placement of a
boundary to delineate a hot spot is somewhat arbitrary.”).
45
Bachner, supra note 34, at 87.
46
See City of New York Police Department, Domain Awareness System: Impact and Use Policy
(Apr. 11, 2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/postfinal/domain-awareness-system-das-nypd-impact-and-use-policy_4.9.21_final.pdf.
47
Id.
48
Bachner, supra note 34, at 88.
49
Richardson et al., supra note 31, at 208.
50
See Ferguson, supra note 38, at 304; see also Emily Berman, Individualized Suspicion in the
Age of Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 463 (2020), https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-105-issue2/individualized-suspicion-in-the-age- of-big-data/.
51
See Richardson et al., supra note 31.
52
Id. See also William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/nyregion/07crime.html; John
Marzulli, We Fabricated Drug Charges Against Innocent People to Meet Arrest Quotas, Former
Detective Testifies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/fabricated-drug-charges-innocent-people-meet-arrestquotas- detective- testifies-article-1.963021.
53
See Richardson et al., supra note 31.
44
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weaponized against them by a PPT system. This means that “those with lengthy
criminal records. . . [will be] stopped because of who they are and not what they
are doing.”54 Notably, the lack of unbiased, independently certifiable data has
caused several departments to abandon their programs.55
Second, there is a likelihood that preemptive monitoring of crime hotspots
will lead to higher numbers of searches of otherwise innocent persons because of
their proximity to a PPT- designated crime hot spot. The use of PPT technology
without sufficient data transparency makes it difficult to challenge the validity of a
stop. A suspect might be completely innocent and stopped regardless, on account
of their proximity to a PPT-designated hotspot. “To mount a coherent challenge to
a particular decision, we must know how that decision is made.”56 However, there
is little transparency into how police departments’ PPT programs weigh each factor
that goes into their analyses. The risk of arbitrary searches is high if police rely on
PPT to generate the reasonable suspicion that permits them to make a stop but
cannot identify how the PPT actually came to its conclusion that reasonable
suspicion exists.57 So far, there is one clear example of PPT causing this type of
situation to occur in an instance where someone was in the wrong place at the wrong
time. In 2020, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a motion to suppress
firearm evidence acquired after police officers stopped and frisked an individual in
close proximity to a PPT- designated hotspot. 58 The court maintained that a
person’s physical presence, even within a PPT-designated high-crime area, cannot
alone create a reasonable suspicion. 59 Concurring opinions also noted the dangers
that PPT poses to those living near high-crime areas, and the risk that such
technology perpetuates bias and illegitimate profiling.60
PPT programs are a form of Big Data policing that have the potential to
enhance public safety, especially when it comes to the effective distribution of
resources in a large jurisdiction. However, until these programs can be sufficiently
54

Ferguson, supra note 38, at 401; see also The Verge, Chicago PD automated policing program
got this man shot twice (May 24, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/c/22444020/chicago-pdpredictive-policing-heat-list.
55
The Santa Cruz Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department and Chicago Police
Department all abandoned their PPT programs because of problematic outcomes reflecting biased
data. See, e.g., Kristi Sturgill, Santa Cruz becomes the first U.S. city to ban predictive policing,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 26, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-26/santacruz-becomes-first-u-s-city-to-ban-predictive-policing; Kathleen Foody, Chicago police end effort
to predict gun offenders, victims, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/41f75b783d796b80815609e737211cc6; Johana Bhuiyan, LAPD ended
predictive policing programs amid public outcry. A new effort shares many of their flaws, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/07/lapd-predictivepolicing-surveillance-reform (noting that in 2019 the LAPD Inspector General found the criteria
used in the program to be inconsistent).
56
Berman, supra note 50, at 502.
57
Id. “A computer model cannot necessarily reveal what exactly is included in the model, how
each factor is weighed, or whether there are factors included in the model that perhaps should not
be taken into account.” Id.
58
United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (8-6 decision).
59
Id. at 331.
60
Id. at 344-45 (Thacker, J., concurring); id. at 334 (Gregory, J., concurring); id. at 336-37 (Wynn,
J., concurring).
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vetted to demonstrate that the information and methods used by the systems are
accurate and unbiased, these programs will continue to produce arbitrary searches
without proper, individualized reasonable suspicion, raising various concerns under
the Fourth Amendment.
ii. Data Collected by Third-Parties and Purchased by Law
Enforcement
Ordinarily, law enforcement seeking access to personal electronic
information from an entity that retains it must obtain a warrant based on probable
cause with sufficient particularity or a court order following the procedures
established by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1986) (“ECPA”). 61
Now, however, state and local police, federal law enforcement entities, and
domestic intelligence agencies are able to purchase bulk, packaged sets of
consumer data collected and categorized by private data brokers for further
downstream analysis.62 Data brokers are for-profit companies, typically operating
in obscurity to consumers, who collect personal information about individual
consumers from a variety of online sources, combine it in a multitude of ways and
then sell it to buyers who, in turn, use that information for their own commercial
purposes.63 There is little transparency or oversight into how much personal
information is purchased by law enforcement and the purposes for which it is
used.64
There are recorded instances of law enforcement entities on record
purchasing “aggregated app-generated location data.”65 This data concerns precise
location data, including “patterns of travel,” which are generated as a byproduct of
a user engagement with a networked device or application. This information is
purportedly de-identified, aggregated, and then sold to data brokers, either directly
from the mobile application, website, or via another broker. The information is then
resold by the data broker to law enforcement. Using this information, law
enforcement entities are able to conduct “suspicion-less searches,” that is, searches
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within these databases that are not based on a particularized suspicion. 66 Though
all the information is de-identified when aggregated by data brokers, is deidentified, re-identification is typically part of the law enforcement processing of
that information.67 Re-identification is made easier when location information is
combined with another type of consumer information known as “advertising
identifier data” (“AdID”), which is also available for purchase by law
enforcement.68 AdID provides information about “where a person is located, what
device they are using, what language they use, which websites they’re visiting and
for how long, and which websites they buy things from.” 69 Details about the extent
to which law enforcement (primarily federal agencies) leverage AdID are scarce;
however, law enforcement agencies have acknowledged that they are able to use
this information to re-identify individual users from location data. 70
This practice circumvents Fourth Amendment protections and is
problematic for two primary reasons. First, the practice exploits a blind spot in
ECPA’s scope of coverage. ECPA prevents “Remote Computing Services''
(“RCS”) and “Electronic Communications Services” (“ECS”) from voluntarily
disclosing non-content information retained about their customers or users to
government entities.71 However, “ECPA permits RCS and ECS providers to
voluntarily share non-content information to non-governmental third parties. If
those third parties are not RCS or ECS providers . . . [,] ECPA does not apply.”72
Because data brokers are neither RCS nor ECS providers under ECPA, they are not
prohibited from sharing or selling geolocation data with the Government.
Second, the type of information sold by data brokers to law enforcement is
akin to the CSLI at issue in Carpenter: in that it is location information that
“provides an intimate window into a person’s life.” 73 Because the Supreme Court
recognized the sensitivity of location information in Carpenter, it should follow
that sensitive information sold by data brokers to law enforcement is afforded the
same protection as CSLI. However, “internal legal justifications of government
purchases . . . are explicit in referencing Carpenter and stating that . . . the case
does not apply to their practice.”74

66

Id.
See, e.g., Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of
Human Mobility, 3 NATURE SCI. REPS., no. 1376 (2013),
http//www.nature.com/articles/srep01376; Jennifer Valentino- DeVries et al., Your Apps Know
Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html.
68
Lynch, supra note 35, at 6.
69
Id.
70
Hamed Aleaziz & Caroline Haskins, DHS Authorities Are Buying Moment-by-Moment
Geolocation Cell Phone
Data to Track People, Buzzfeed (Oct. 30, 2020, 6:19 PM),
http://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice- dhs-cell-phone-data-trackinggeolocation.
71
18 U.S.C. §§§ 2510(15), 2711(22), 2702(a).
72
Shenkman et al., supra note 62, at 16. Notably, “in most cases where devices and apps record
location information, it has been considered to be ‘non-content’ information.” Id.
73
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
74
Shenkman et al., supra note 62, at 18.
67

12

The constitutionality of this current arrangement where multiple forms of sensitive
data are sold by data brokers to law enforcement is suspect. The lack of
transparency, regulatory oversight and judicial scrutiny of this practice means that
it will continue to grow unchecked, with “multiple agencies spending upwards of
tens of millions of dollars on multi-year contracts” lacking any concern for the
erosion of constitutionally guaranteed protections against unreasonable search and
seizure.75
iii. Geofence Warrants
Geofence warrants, or “reverse location searches,” are instances where law
enforcement uses a warrant to acquire data directly from the entity that retains the
data.76 Geofencing allows police to “identify all devices that were in a given area
during a given time period in the past.” 77 After law enforcement receives judicial
approval, a three-step process occurs. First, a geofence warrant is submitted to the
entity holding the location data. The warrant provides a search radius expressed in
location coordinates and a set duration of time, though it does not name a specific
person, device, or account. For example, a request for “all implicated users [within
the search parameters], their phone numbers and IP addresses” is sufficient. 78
Second, once received, the subjected entity executes an indiscriminate
search of all its databases that house user-account location information. The entity
subject to the warrant then extracts the data specified with the given parameters and
provides it to law enforcement. This means that in response to the initial request,
detailed location information of individuals with no connection to the underlying
criminal investigation is provided to law enforcement for analysis.
Third, in response to this initial dragnet, law enforcement returns with a
narrowed request for information about particular users in that search radius. 79
Geofence warrants are a potent example of how Big Data policing, in the
absence of clearly defined judicial and legislative oversight, erodes constitutional
protections from arbitrary and expansive searches. 80 In many cases, these warrants
permit overly broad searches lacking the particularity or probable cause required
for traditional warrants. Rather, they are “fishing expeditions” that involve “the
very sort of general exploratory rummaging that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to prohibit.”81 Additionally, the scale and frequency of the requests
raises questions about the effectiveness of judicial oversight in the warrant approval
process.
75

Id. at 7.
See Note, Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2508 (2021),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2021/05/geofence-warrants-and-the-fourth-amendment. Google, for
example, is a popular recipient of these requests, from June to Jan 2020 it received approximately
19,000 search warrants. Id.
77
Lynch, supra note 35, at 3.
78
Note, supra note 76, at 2515.
79
Id.
80
According to Google, from 2018 to 2020, 95.6 percent of requests came from state and local
police. Lynch, supra note 35.
81
Note, supra note 76, at 2513-14.
76

13

Judges have been known to approve multiple warrants in “a few minutes”
and, often without “realizing the technical details or broad scope of the searches
they are authorizing” because the warrant application consists of coordinates, not a
visual map of the area to be searched. 82 Moreover, geofence warrants are an
evolving practice, and police are using them to acquire more and more detailed
information about users and their networked devices, beyond their location. For
example, police are also requesting “keyword search history.” 83
No court has held that geofence warrants are categorically unconstitutional,
and the use of these warrants by law enforcement is increasing. 84 Therefore, while
it is possible to draft a geofence warrant with probable cause and sufficient
particularity, there is recognition that without careful scrutiny “it is easy for a
geofence warrant . . . to cross the threshold into unconstitutionality.” 85 Recent case
law indicates that the judiciary is split with regard to the dangers of geofencing. For
example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the scope of a geofence warrant used to identify all devices in the area of a
bank robbery, including the defendant’s, “plainly violates the rights enshrined in
the [Fourth] Amendment.”86 The judgment made clear that the three-step process
of these warrants was not adequate and that even “anonymized location data—from
innocent people—can reveal astonishing glimpses into individuals’ private lives.” 87
This ruling marks an important step in adapting the Fourth Amendment to
counterbalance Big Data policing more effectively. Still, the lack of judicial clarity
and legislative oversight regarding geofence warrants, which are only increasing in
their scope and sophistication, threatens constitutional protections against
indiscriminate searches.
III.

REORIENTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND OTHER
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO BIG DATA POLICING

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is “patchwork” and is “cobbled together”
from inconsistent doctrines. 88 However, this characterization reflects the dynamic
nature of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, which is an
important feature given the protections that it explicitly provides. The flexibility of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding what constitutes a search or seizure is
82
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necessary in the face of constantly evolving government methods for executing
searches and seizures. As “[n]ew [policing] practices arise . . . and begin to threaten
the Fourth Amendment equilibrium, [they are] then addressed by judicial decisions
that make the necessary adjustment.” 89 Big data policing is the new practice to
which the courts and legislatures must respond. Below I present three measures that
the courts and legislatures can take in connection to halt the erosion of Fourth
Amendment rights facilitated by Big Data policing.
a. Eliminating the Third-Party Doctrine
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, in dicta, expressed
concern about the limited applicability of the third-party doctrine in light of modern
information sharing practices. 90 However, the Court explicitly declined to abandon
the doctrine beyond declaring that it did not apply to a customer’s historical CSLI
retained by a telecommunications provider. 91 The Court could have been more
assertive and used Carpenter as the case to close the book on the third-party
doctrine.92 As it stands, the third-party doctrine remains an ill-suited method for
assessing an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy over their digital
information during a time “in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 93
The third-party doctrine is anachronistic. Its rigid approach to information
transfers does not take into consideration the reasonable expectations of privacy
held by the public regarding their online activity and fails to acknowledge the
reality that the voluntariness of this sharing is not a meaningful assumption of risk,
especially “given how omnipresent and necessary technological disclosures are.” 94
The mere fact that much of daily life is conducted digitally has not necessarily
changed the public’s attitude toward the privacy of their intimate digital
information. Studies show that “a majority of people do not knowingly convey their
locations information to cell phone providers and expect law enforcement to obtain
a warrant before gathering information.” 95 As stated, the Fourth Amendment is
flexible in response to technological progress and changing societal attitudes about
what information, activities, and behaviors the public holds a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
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The amount of granular information that is collected by third parties about
an individual because of that individual’s participation in modern society is
immense.96 Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect an individual to waive their
expectation of privacy consciously, knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily in
every instance of digital interaction during which their information is collected. To
the contrary, because of the information economy, individuals are pushed, prodded,
incentivized, encouraged, and cajoled into sharing even more information in
exchange for participation in the most basics of online activities. This information
then becomes the source of warrantless Big Data policing, and law enforcement
will continue to leverage such data unless told otherwise. While Carpenter might
have narrowly limited the third-party doctrine, the Court needs to take a bold step
toward rebalancing Fourth Amendment protections by abolishing the view that the
“voluntary” sharing of information with a third-party in the digital context defeats
the sharer’s reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.
b. Adopting a Source-Based Test for When a Search Occurs
The Court should build on its reasonable expectation of police capabilities
inquiry introduced in Carpenter and adopt a bright- line rule to establish when a
search of digital information occurs. A bright-line rule supports the sound policy
that police have clear knowledge about what activities they are permitted to engage
in without a warrant and when a warrant is required. This bright-line rule would
ask “whether any information revealed to the government was dependent or relied
on use of a technology that Carpenter covers.”97 If so, then a warrant is needed.
While Fourth Amendment cases are fact and context specific, the courts
should not rely on “difficult line drawing exercises” that attempt to assess, in a
given context, whether so much information has been transferred from the
individual to the government that a search has occurred.98 Rather, Big Data policing
methods should be treated as searches because their “fruits” (i.e., the digital
information acquired) are categorically different from those of analogous predigital search methods. 99 In other words, digital records are different, and when
they are created without meaningful voluntary choice while simultaneously
revealing personal information, they should be covered under the Fourth
Amendment. Under this framework, there are three steps that a court may take to
assess whether a search has occurred.
First, determine whether the record subject to a search is a new type of
record meaning that had it is not previously been available through pre-digital or
conventional surveillance methods (e.g., website search history). This step
underscores the intent of the Court in Carpenter, which is that Fourth Amendment
protections extend to digital records and that digital records are different than their
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pre-digital analogues.100 Because of this difference, a new approach is necessary to
“best maintain the original balance [between Fourth Amendment rights and public
safety goals] before the Internet age.”101
Second, if the record is “new,” its creation must not be voluntary. As argued
in Part IV.A above, the digital age frustrates the logic of the third-party doctrine
when so much important information is created as a by-product of daily life. Where
in Carpenter, the Court found CSLI inescapable, so too are a variety of other
automatically created non-content records.
Take, for example, email and its pre-digital analog of mail sent via the post
office (“snail mail”). The exterior of an envelope in the mail, containing the “to”
and “from” information, is considered publicly available metadata. The same
applies for an email message with the added inclusion of the “subject” line at the
top of the message. Collectively, this information is considered “envelope” data
and is unprotected against warrantless searches for both mediums of
communication, while the contents of both forms remain protected. However,
because “digital is different,” the metadata generated by an email message is more
detailed and novel than that of a traditional envelope, and much of this metadata is
created involuntarily.102 Additionally, the government’s capacity to use Big Data
policing techniques to surveil communications metadata is significantly different
than its pre-digital surveillance capabilities for snail mail. This capacity is amplified
by the frequency with which individuals send email or internet messages and the
length of time with which message information is stored by third parties. 103
Third, if a record is “new” and involuntarily created, it is only protected if
it reveals sufficiently private information. Involuntary or automatically generated
records that reveal an intimate portrait of a person should be protected from
warrantless searches. Therefore, whether it is autogenerated, real-time location
information created by an individual’s physical mobile telephone, or the detailed
metadata of an internet message, both reveal intimate details to which individuals
hold reasonable expectations of privacy. 104
Adopting a test that provides a bright-line framework for Fourth
Amendment searches would bring much needed clarity to law enforcement as they
deploy rapidly evolving Big Data policing methods. Although the test would
establish an expanded presumption of privacy in many digital records and could,
thus, provide a safe harbor for illicit activities to be free from surveillance and
investigation, such presumption is necessary to counterbalance the already
pervasive surveillance capacities enabled by Big Data policing.
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c. Legislative Solutions to Big Data Policing
Taking steps to shore-up protections against unreasonable, arbitrary, and
expansive search and seizure practices does not have to wait for judicial action.
Federal and state legislatures have enacted and should continue to enact laws that
establish oversight mechanisms for Big Data policing techniques and methods.
Developing regulations for Big Data policing must include the public’s perspective,
that the lawmaking process provides. Legislative efforts to tackle Big Data policing
can be grouped into three categories: (1) moratoriums, bans, and restrictions on
certain Big Data technologies and methods; (2) regulations for transparency and
efficacy in law enforcement collection and use of Big Data; and (3) specific laws
closing gaps in Fourth Amendment coverage that are currently exploited by Big
Data policing.
The most aggressive regulatory action that, many municipalities and states
have already taken, is to categorically ban the use of certain technologies by
police.105 The benefit of a moratorium or ban is clear: the erosion of civil liberties
that results from the widespread adoption of Big Data policing methods with little
judicial or legislative oversight is instantly halted. Predictive Policing Technology
is particularly ripe for this ban. With a checkered history of accuracy in the major
metropolitan areas in which it has been adopted, PPT is shown to cause the arbitrary
surveillance of, and even detention of, innocent individuals. The risk to civil
liberties is too high to adopt this technology, especially when the effectiveness of
PPT is not entirely clear as there is limited transparency into the frequency of its
use. As such, the technology should be banned until its trustworthiness can be
proven. The burden of proof in such instances should be on law enforcement; there
should not be a presumption of objectivity or reasonableness unless and until the
technology is demonstrated to be unbiased.
Citizens have the right to know about the nature of the Big Data policing
methods to which they are subjected. The current complexity and obscurity of many
such methods undermines the legitimacy of their application. Without sufficient
transparency and efficacy controls, citizens and lawmakers cannot know whether
the Big Data methods are accurate or even whether they work as advertised.
Therefore, lawmakers should institute robust transparency regulations for Big Data
policing. Such regulations should include provisions to illuminate the contractual
relationships of law enforcement entities with third parties who provide the
technology or from whom police acquire information. Information transparency is
critical as well. If Big Data policing tools are only as good as the information they
analyze, it is imperative that this information be publicly scrutinized and vetted.
Any application of Big Data policing must make clear the specific information that
technology uses and how it uses it to generate insights. In turn, the sources of
information and the information itself should be independently audited prior to
deployment to ensure accuracy and non-bias. Finally, law enforcement agencies
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who use Big Data policing methods should be required to provide routine reports
about their effectiveness and frequency of use. If the technology does not produce
effective results, or is infrequently used, that should be communicated to lawmakers
who can then address these deficiencies.
Certain Big Data policing practices, like the purchasing of third-party
collected data for down-stream analysis or geofence warrants, reside in a Fourth
Amendment gray zone. They are currently considered lawful activities, despite the
concerns they raise about particularity and reasonable suspicion in the context of a
search. Lawmakers should pass legislation that either bans transactions between
third-party data brokers and law enforcement or severely restricts and regulates
such transactions. There should not be a scenario where the government is able to
purchase data that it would otherwise need a warrant to acquire. At the federal level,
for example, bills such as “The Fourth Amendment is Not for Sale Act” are an
important step in building a stronger federal regulatory apparatus for Big Data
policing practices.106 At the state level, measures such as requiring data brokers to
register with the Secretary of State provide much needed transparency. 107 Similarly,
with regard to geofence warrants, steps can be taken to formalize the shadowy
process of dragnet law enforcement search requests to companies like Google. As
a private entity, Google has taken steps to challenge the expansiveness of geofence
requests, but it cannot be expected to shoulder the burden of protecting this
information unilaterally. Individual states can act to require law enforcement to be
more particular with their initial search requests or ban the practice entirely.
However, because of the interstate nature of location data, a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme should be prioritized. Rather than relying on court challenges to
geofence warrants to provide clarity on this practice, legislatures must be proactive
in developing geofence warrant guidelines.
CONCLUSION
Each time a new technology expanded law enforcement capabilities, the
Fourth Amendment readjusts to counterbalance those enhanced capabilities and
affirm the rights of people. In the face of Big Data policing, the Fourth Amendment
must once again be reinterpreted to effectively protect individuals in the modern
information economy. Big Data provides immense opportunities for law
enforcement to better serve and ensure public safety; but, the risks to individual
privacy are equally high. To counterbalance this danger, three things must happen.
First, our understanding of the reasonable expectation of privacy over certain
information under the Fourth Amendment must expand through the removal of the
third-party doctrine, because the doctrine is anachronistic considering modern
information collection practices.
Second, the courts must adopt a clearer test for determining when a search
has occurred. This test should be a bright-line framework that assesses: (1) the
novelty of the information subject to a search; (2) the voluntariness of that
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information sharing; and (3) the intimacy of the information shared. Third and
finally, legislatures must address the areas where Fourth Amendment protection
remains weak. through legislation Where appropriate, the adoption of Big Data
policing techniques should be halted or, alternatively, stringently regulated to
maximize transparency, accountability, and trust by the public. Taken together,
these efforts will allow the potential of Big Data to be realized without it costing us
our privacy rights.
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